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J2MsSANc UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 1 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -----x 2 3 STEVE SANDS, 4 Plaintiff, 5 18 Civ. 7345 (JSR) v. 6 CBS INTERACTIVE, INC., 7 Defendant. 8 New York, N.Y. February 22, 2019 9 4:00 p.m. 10 Before: 11 HON. JED S. RAKOFF, 12 District Judge 13 APPEARANCES 14 LEIBOWITZ LAW FIRM, PLLC 15 Attorneys for Plaintiff BY: RICHARD LIEBOWITZ JAMES H. FREEMAN 16 17 COWAN, DEBAETS, ABRAHAMS & SHEPPARD, LLP Attorneys for Defendant 18 BY: ELEANOR M. LACKMAN LINDSAY R. EDELSTEIN 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

(Case called)

THE COURT: Good afternoon. We have three motions.

There is the parties' competing motions for summary judgment,

and then there is the motion for leave to amend from the

defendant.

The motion for leave to amend is denied. I am very doubtful that it has any merit, that the claim has any merit, but quite aside from that, I don't reach that because it is grossly untimely.

Everything is done in this case except today's argument. We are ready for trial. We are going to set the trial in about 30 seconds.

Of course, since I am not dismissing on the merits but just on the grounds of untimeliness, the dismissal or the denial of the motion is without prejudice. If you feel you want to file a separate lawsuit with respect to this dubious claim, you're welcome to.

Second, assuming the case were to go to trial, how long a trial does plaintiff's counsel envision?

MR. FREEMAN: Well, your Honor, if it were to be a jury trial, we would envision three days.

THE COURT: You want a jury trial. Didn't you ask for a jury trial?

MR. FREEMAN: We did. We did not discuss a possibility of a bench trial with the defendants yet. We would

trial.

1 be open to a bench trial in terms of efficiency. THE COURT: It is a jury trial, how long? 2 3 MR. FREEMAN: Three days. 4 THE COURT: Does defense counsel agree with that. 5 MR. LACKMAN: I think two at least three days. don't think there are a lot of witnesses in this case. 6 7 THE COURT: All right. I have my calendar. 8 What days in April are you not available for trial? 9 MR. FREEMAN: Your Honor, I know I'm on vacation one 10 week in April. It is the week of the 14th. My brother's 50th 11 birthday. 12 THE COURT: Even without your mentioning that, which 13 of course tugs at my heart strings, I was not going to 14 interfere with your vacation. It won't be the week of the 15 14th. What about defense counsel? 16 17 MR. LACKMAN: I have a trial that starts on March 26. 18 It may go two weeks long, so it would perhaps be after 19 Mr. Freeman is back. That would be the best time to proceed. 20 THE COURT: Lets look at late April. Let me ask my 21 courtroom deputy. 22 What about April 22 or April 29? 23 THE DEPUTY CLERK: April 29 you're at Fordham in the 24 morning only. April 22 is fine. Then the 24th, we start a

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THE COURT: Lets put it down for April 22 at 9:00 a.m.

That is also Earth day, so...

THE DEPUTY CLERK: You do leave on that coming weekend for Brazil.

THE COURT: The subsequent week?

THE DEPUTY CLERK: Yes.

THE COURT: But they are saying a three-day trial.

Now, lets turn to the motions for summary judgment.

Lets turn first to the issue of liability. I'll ask counsel to go to the roster when we're having this argument.

Let me ask defense counsel why you believe the copyright office's certification that the photographs at issue were registered is inconclusive.

MR. LACKMAN: Well --

THE COURT: No. Over there. Sorry.

MR. LACKMAN: That's all right.

THE COURT: That's because when you stand at the table, the microphone really can't pick you up.

MR. LACKMAN: That's fine.

Well, actually, the presumption of validity, as the copyright office issues registration certificate, is easily rebutted. It can be rebutted whether there is other evidence in the record that casts doubt on the question. This is the <a href="#">Arvant</a> case in the Second Circuit --

THE COURT: What do you say is the rebuttal here?

 $$\operatorname{MR}.$$  LACKMAN: There are a couple issues. One is that this is a derivative work. There is no indication to any --

THE COURT: What is your basis for saying it is a derivative work?

MR. LACKMAN: The photograph is a creation, a recordation of what Marvel was recording at the time, the costuming, the lighting.

THE COURT: As I understand it, Mr. Sands was not copying something or deriving something from a motion picture or some other audiovisual work. He was photographing real people from particular angles and particular viewpoints that he brought to bear. I don't understand why you think it is a derivative.

MR. LACKMAN: Sure.

It is true that he was taking pictures of live action. These were actually characters who were costumed and lit and other things by Marvel. But the fact of the matter is that the Copyright Act doesn't require that the underlying work be fixed, it just requires that it is a work.

So a derivative work can be created by a -- Section 102 is very clear, it has a separate requirement between a work and a fixation. So a derivative work just needs to be a copy of a work, and the work that was being created and expressed there is essentially like a stage play. If someone was recording video from the balcony of a theatrical production,

the production live is still a work whether or not it is fixed.

The derivative work requirement does not require the underlying work be fixed in a tangible medium.

THE COURT: Well, all right.

What other objections do you have to the presumption?

MR. LACKMAN: Well, there is also the fact that we received -- we asked for evidence very early on regarding the metadata in the photos. We got a bunch of evidence that was not on point that consisted of -- it is cases and things like that.

What we really wanted to know and to confirm -- there are so many photos that look the same, even Mr. Sands said, yes, there are a lot of these. I can't tell the difference between these photos. We wanted to make sure that what was registered is what he took. He never provided his metadata to us, and when we received information on the registrations, when it was provided to us, it was accessed two days before the deposition, but not provided to us until the evening of the last day of fact discovery.

We didn't even realize that there might be an issue. Mr. Sands testified that on the day he takes the photos, he sends them over. The information that was provided to us on January 18, at around six o'clock, was --

THE COURT: Discovery is closed.

MR. LACKMAN: Well, that is correct.

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THE COURT: Excuse me.

I make it extremely easy for the parties to a lawsuit, if they are having problems during discovery because some side is not providing them with timely responses or there is some other problem of any kind whatsoever, all they need to do is jointly call the court pursuant to my individual rules and I usually get them an answer right then and there, certainly within a matter of hours.

MR. LACKMAN: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: So all matters relating to discovery that have been raised were resolved, and I am not going to hear any further ones at this time.

MR. LACKMAN: Of course, your Honor.

The point is that I was assured by plaintiff's counsel that all relevant documents had been provided before the deposition, which happened on January 10.

THE COURT: That, in your view, that wasn't true or that they were too belated?

MR. LACKMAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: Which one?

MR. LACKMAN: It wasn't true.

THE COURT: It wasn't true?

MR. LACKMAN: That --

THE COURT: So your remedy is to ask for an additional deposition.

The

J2MsSANc MR. LACKMAN: Well, there just wouldn't be time. documents were provided on the last day of discovery. We just wouldn't have time. We think --THE COURT: No, no. My point is this: What you could have done is call the court jointly with your adversary -- it would be extremely easy, especially if you were conducting the deposition, you would both be there in the same room -- and say, Judge, in addition to the deposition today, we want discovery extended for the limited purpose of taking additional discovery of this plaintiff as soon as we get the documents that we either haven't gotten or were belatedly produced.

But you didn't do that.

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MR. LACKMAN: Well, Judge, maybe I'm not being clear.

What happened was that the deposition happened on the Prior to that time, we were assured that all responsive documents had been provided. During the deposition, there was some indication that there was some metadata, and in addition -- we didn't know this -- but apparently the Leibowitz firm had a bunch of information that they didn't provide and they actually accessed it two days before. They said you'll have all the documents prior.

THE COURT: Have you received --

MR. LACKMAN: We were --

THE COURT: Excuse me.

Have you received that all now?

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MR. LACKMAN: We received it on the night of the close of fact discovery.

THE COURT: So you've received it?

MR. LACKMAN: Correct, and we would like to ask the plaintiff about this material at trial.

THE COURT: Well, I am not sure how it bears on the presumption issue.

How is it going to bear on the presumption issue?

MR. LACKMAN: There are problems or inconsistencies in his testimony that pertain to what was provided, and we actually cannot know whether the material that the photos that he took were actually the photos that were provided to the Leibowitz firm because it conflicts directly with his testimony, and we had no basis to know that until we were more than 48 hours after the deposition happened.

THE COURT: All right. So anything else on the presumption issue?

MR. LACKMAN: No, your Honor, not on this specific issue.

THE COURT: Let me hear from plaintiff's counsel.

MR. FREEMAN: All right. Thank you, your Honor.

In terms of the validity of the copyright, they have failed to present any evidence to rebut the validity of the copyright. Not only do we have a valid copyright registration form, but both parties sent to the U.S. Copyright office, after

the pendency of this litigation was commenced, a request for the copyright office to produce official certified deposit copies showing that the photographs were, in fact, on deposit with the copyright office. There is no question of fact in terms of whether the photographs are on deposit.

What they seem to be speculating -- and it is pure speculation -- is that Mr. Sands is not the true author of these particular photographs, and we have placed an abundance of evidence on record showing that Mr. Sands was, in fact -- is, in fact -- the true author and photographer of these photographs, including screenshots from his laptop computer. And, of course, he is sworn to it.

THE COURT: There is no discrepancy in his testimony.

What about their complaint that not everything that should have been produced was produced before his deposition, and some of it even was as late as the day before the close of discovery?

MR. FREEMAN: After, at the deposition was the first time, to my knowledge, that they asked for underlying metadata to the photographs. In fact, the day after the deposition, the morning after, opposing counsel sent me a laundry list of document requests which were not a part of her original document requests and said, we need to get all this stuff and what did we do.

We went, and we went back to the client and we said,

We need to compile whatever else you have, you know, please 1 2 search your records. We want to comply. We did comply. We 3 gave them everything they wanted, even though they didn't 4 initially ask for those documents. Had we known prior to the 5 date of the deposition that they were seeking such information, 6 we, of course, would have provided it. It is our policy to 7 just hand it over. THE COURT: Yes. 8 9 The deposition was when? 10 MR. FREEMAN: On January 10. 11 THE COURT: Discovery closed? MR. FREEMAN: The 26th. 12 13 MR. LACKMAN: 18th. 14 MR. FREEMAN: 18th. 15 THE COURT: They made this request right after the 16 deposition?

MR. FREEMAN: Correct.

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THE COURT: Then you responded before the close of discovery, albeit not only very shortly before the close of discovery, correct?

MR. FREEMAN: Correct. My client did have to --

THE COURT: All right. So let me go back to defense counsel.

So these were documents that you only requested after the deposition. And, of course, you could have set the

deposition much earlier, but you chose, or jointly chose, to fix it shortly before the close of discovery.

You find out at the deposition that there is documents that you hadn't previously requested that you now want. That is not untypical of what happens at a deposition. So you promptly request them, but you had to know at that very moment that they might occasion a further deposition of the plaintiff, so that was the time when you should have approached the court.

MR. LACKMAN: Your Honor, I want to make sure, to clarify a couple points.

One is these documents were requested in our original request. We had at least one, maybe two meet-and-confers prior to the deposition. We wanted to get all documents in as soon as we could. We had discovery period that overlapped the holidays and the earliest we could do after -- we were still getting documents in December. The earliest we could do was January 10.

And the documents we received were in the possession of plaintiff's counsel. They were documents that they used, they intended to use to support their argument that their photos were validly registered. We had a defense regarding that point, and they never produced — plaintiff's counsel never produced those documents. And they were accessed, the document we received showed that they were accessed by plaintiff's counsel on January 8. They didn't provide them at

the deposition or otherwise, and we received them not the day before the last day of discovery, but roughly -- I was in California when they showed up, I don't know the exact time, but I know it was dark in LA -- on the last day of fact discovery.

THE COURT: All right. So here is what I will allow, even though, in my view, defense counsel still has not been diligent in seeking relief for all you're now complaining about before the close of discovery. That was your time when, as I say, it would have been so easy to convene a call, but you didn't remember.

Nevertheless, because I'm well-known for my generosity, I will give you a two-hour additional deposition of the plaintiff to be completed by no later than Friday of next week. You may then, if you feel on the basis of that deposition that you have some additional information bearing on summary judgment to bring to the attention of the court, you may file a supplement to your summary judgment papers by no later than Tuesday of the following week.

So lets put dates on this. The deposition, the two-hour telephonic deposition must occur by March 1.

Defendant's additional papers, limited to five double-spaced pages, must be filed by Tuesday, March 5.

Any answering papers must be filed by Friday, March 8.

I will hold off ruling on the motions until I receive

those papers.

I will tell you in advance that I am extremely skeptical of your argument about this not being an original work, but feel free to make whatever arguments you want.

Lets turn to the question of willfulness. Frankly, there, it seems to me, there are genuine issues of material fact that remain to be resolved, but I'll hear anything anyone wants to further say beyond your -- I've looked at your papers, obviously.

Lets hear first on that from plaintiff's counsel and then defense counsel.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

So the issue of willfulness, when dealing with the defendant, who is in the publishing industry, a sophisticated defendant in the publishing industry, our position is that the evidentiary threshold necessary to establish willfulness is particularly low. And this is actually embodied in the case law, which holds that a publisher is charged with knowledge of copyright law, particularly if they have experience in exploiting copyrights, they have experience in licensing copyrights, they have policies, procedures, training manuals in place.

If they are engaged in activity that is infringing, if they are engaged in activity where they have not done any due diligence, whatever, to obtain a license or find out who the

photographer is, there is a very strong presumption that they have acted in reckless disregard of the photographer's rights.

We have never taken the position of de facto willfulness. We just feel that the evidentiary threshold, again, is very low. We start in that position. It would be different if we were suing a restaurant or a bowling alley who also exploit copyrights. They are not in the business of exploiting copyrights.

Here, this is what CBS does. So we've established, number one, they obviously are in the publishing industry. We asked during discovery for a plethora of information relating to what policies they had in place, what training manuals they have in place. They claim they employ independent contractors to post photographs to the website.

OK, so what do they know about licensing photographs? Are they just hired and just, you know, given open access to the website and they can just post photographs at will, or is there some supervising editor? They didn't produce anything.

During the entire course of this litigation, they produced nine pages of documents. They said they didn't have any evidence of training manuals. They didn't have any evidence of employee handbooks. What does that tell us? That tells us that they don't have any procedures in place and that maybe sometimes they license photographs and maybe sometimes they don't. I guess it just depends on who has access to the

website. So, again, we are looking at a large-scale corporation who are posting photographs online without bothering to conduct any due diligence whatsoever.

In addition, they have admitted, though, that they do use standard licensing agreements for photographs every now and then. So they must have some inkling, right, that there is a requirement that they obtain permission from the photographer. So, again, we have either they have no policies at all, or if they do, they failed to implement them in this particular case.

Now, their sole defense is that the individual who they claim posted the photographs online they believe had harbored a subjective good faith belief that these photographs were publicity handouts distributed by Marvel Studios or Netflix. The producers or the distributor of the film.

Unfortunately for them, there is not a shred of objective evidence on the record that that is what happened. Now, why do we say that? Because we know that they got the photographs from another website, a competing website, Comingsoon.net.

Now, this website had Steve Sands, this website was an authorized sublicensee of Steve Sands' works. They acquired the photographs from Getty. So Steve Sands takes the photographs, he uploads them to Getty, and then Getty makes them available to whoever wants to license them.

So in this case, Comingsoon.net licensed them via

their parent company, Evolve Media, and Comingsoon.net had an authorized license to display those photographs online. The editor of CBS Interactive went and simply shoplifted the photographs from the website and republished them on gamesspot.com.

They are saying, well, he believed that these were publicity handouts from Marvel. OK, well, that belief must be objectivity reasonable under the circumstances. What evidence is there on the record to support that subjective good faith, alleged good faith belief?

THE COURT: Who is this person?

MR. FREEMAN: Dan Otty.

THE COURT: Was his deposition taken?

MR. FREEMAN: His deposition was not taken, your Honor.

THE COURT: Was any affidavit or declaration produced from him?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes. They produced an affidavit. In the affidavit, which is mostly speculative, he doesn't recall the details. He says he doesn't even know where he got the photographs from, which is a huge red flag, but he says that because there is a Comingsoon.net watermark on the photographs, that, oh, he must have got them from Comingsoon.net.

Now, had he harbored a good faith belief that these were publicity handouts, one would imagine that such

photographs would have on them a watermark indicating that they belonged to Marvel Studios or to Netflix and would say, for example, for promotional uses only and here is the terms.

There is no evidence of that. Had he got them, for example, from the Netflix website or from Marvel's website, from a publicity or press kit, a digital press kit, a hard copy press kit, this would be a very much different case.

But for them to come into court and say, oh, well there is this custom and practice without any evidence — there is this custom and practice of movie studios handing out the still shots to promote the film, and I was aware of that custom and practice and I thought that this was just not a bunch of publicity stills.

THE COURT: I got the point.

MR. FREEMAN: You get the point?

THE COURT: Yes. Thank you very much.

Let me hear from defense counsel. Thank you.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you.

MR. LACKMAN: Your Honor, I think your Honor hit the nail on the head in a way. Your Honor is also talking about the opportunity to take discovery. Mr. Otty was disclosed as the editor of the overall website. There was no deposition notice. There was no attempt to take a deposition. There was nothing.

The documents that were requested were wildly

overbroad. They wanted all kinds of information, and we told them, you need to send us a narrow request. They didn't do it.

So what happened in this instance, Mr. Otty testified to his state of mind and his understanding, and the concept that there is no custom and practice is belied by Mr. Sands own testimony. Studios do hand out publicity materials in order to get promotion for their upcoming works. This is a custom and practice, and it is widely known and widely used.

So there was certainly a reason for him to believe that, and if they don't believe it, you can't create an issue of fact just by speculating. You have to take the person's deposition. Ask for his testimony and cross-examine him with those points, but it is right now it is unrebutted.

THE COURT: All right. I will reserve judgment.

The next issue was the plaintiff's request for attorneys' fees. This really is, in effect, premature because I don't reach that unless I find that the various defenses to liability were frivolous, etc.

I don't need to hear argument. It is a function of what I find with respect to those particular elements. When I say premature, it is proper to file it at this time, I just mean there is no point for oral argument, since it is really derivative, to use a bad term from the arguments, on liability.

The final item is the defendant seeks summary judgment on the question of whether this is a single work, and I thought

this has been resolved -- but let me hear from defense counsel -- by the copyright office's rule regarding group registration of photographs.

MR. LACKMAN: Sure.

Actually, we have a copy of it with us. I just want to preface the fact that it was posted this morning. Judge Batts ruled on this issue and determined — it is not a question about whether it is a single work. The question is whether plaintiff gets one damages award or multiple damages awards.

Our argument is it is a damages question. We actually have a copy. If the court needs it, we can hand up a copy of the ruling from this morning. As soon as we received it, we provided it to them this morning.

THE COURT: Let me take a look.

MR. LACKMAN: Hold on just a second.

(Pause).

MR. LACKMAN: Should the court want it, we have copies of the registrations that were at issue in the case as well.

Your Honor, in this ruling, Judge Batts found that where a copyright holder chose --

THE COURT: What page are you looking at?

MR. LACKMAN: That's a really good question.

It is page 13, your Honor.

THE COURT: Hang on a minute.

(Pause)

 $$\operatorname{MR.}$  LACKMAN: Where it begins Mindent cites Ryan and other cases and it ends --

THE COURT: Let me just read it.

MR. LACKMAN: Sure.

THE COURT: Thank you.

(Pause)

Of course I'm seeing this for the first time now, but it doesn't appear, on a very quick look of this, that Judge Batts discusses at all the impact, if any, of the copyright office's rule regarding group registration of the photographs.

My understanding is that that ruling makes clear that "The office will examine each photograph in the group and if the claim is approved, the registration covers each photograph and each photograph is registered as a separate work. Thus, if the photographs are subsequently infringed, the copyright owner should be entitled to seek a separate award of statutory damages for each individual photograph."

Now, that was issued on January 18, 2018. I don't know if it was brought to the attention of Judge Batts, who does not address it in her opinion of yesterday, but that is the issue I'm raising.

MR. LACKMAN: Well, there is that issue.

We believe that Judge Batts is correct in that the type of registration is the same, but there is a separate

point, which it is not -- just because you can sue separately on a separate work, there is law -- and we have cited it in our brief -- that says even if something is registered as a collective work, if it is registered as a set with a nearly identical title on the same date from the same shoot, the copyright act would likely consider it a compilation and, therefore, there is nothing that says that you get separate statutory damages awards.

THE COURT: Well, no, no. That is apparently the kind of precedent that Judge Batts -- again, on a very quick reading of her ruling -- seems to be relying on. But the copyright office's rules, if it is binding on the court, seems to say just the opposite.

MR. LACKMAN: The copyright office's rule says that it is possible. It doesn't say that it is required.

Based on the facts here --

THE COURT: Well, it says "thus if the photographs are subsequently infringed" -- and we're talking now about a group registration -- "the copyright owner should be entitled to seek a separate award of statutory damages for each individual photograph."

So the keyword there is "should." Now it may not be binding on me, but they are making an assertion of law, it seems to me.

MR. LACKMAN: Well, the law is, and the commentators

are clear, Bill Patry says, Patry and Copyright says that valid registration satisfies the prerequisites for suing thereby permitting but not requiring a separate award of statutory damages per work.

In cases we cited, such as <u>Yellow Pages v. ZIPLOCAL</u>, they found that, you know, there was one award appropriate where the photographs were taken of one subject by one photographer at a single session. The evidence in the record shows that Mr. Sands licenses per shoot and not per photograph.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LACKMAN: Therefore, under these circumstances, for both of those reasons, this is one of these types of uses that allows Mr. Sands to claim one award of statutory damages, not five.

THE COURT: All right. Let me hear from plaintiff's counsel.

MR. FREEMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

It is not often, actually, you use the word frivolous, because I'm a member of the plaintiff's bar and that word gets thrown around a lot, but this is a case where there is a bright line between a compilation and a group registration of photographs.

Every single case that they cite in their principal brief and their reply brief deals with compilations and collective works. In this Circuit, according to the expressed

understanding of the statute, you only get one statutory damages award for a compilation. Had Steve Sands registered a compilation with the intent to create a coffee table book of all of his photographs of the Marvel characters, he would only be entitled to one work.

This group registration, however, is not that at all. It is a registration with 736 photographs that were organized according to one parameter, the date. There is no originality. Compilation has to have some sort of minimum threshold of originality to become a compilation. Here, it is just a group registration that was administratively organized according to dates.

All the cases that they have cited, including the Yellow Pages citation from the Eleventh Circuit, is a compilation case. Now, in this Circuit and in other circuits, they have what is called an economic, independent economic viability exception to the compilation rule. Here, we don't follow that in the Second Circuit. But other circuits, they say, well, if you register a compilation and one of the portions or components of that registration is economically viable as an independent work, then if you can prove that it is independent, you might get an exception to the rule that under compilations you only get one work. The Second Circuit has repeatedly rejected that argument and has held fast to the statutory language.

Here, we are not dealing with a compilation. We are not dealing with a collective work. The registration satisfies the three prerequisites: It is the same photographer, all the paragraphs are registered in the same calendar here, and it is the same copyright claimant.

To sort of close the deal on that, there is the group registration of photographs 83F32542-01. This is a regulation where they say the office — it is a comment to the regulation. The office will examine each photograph in the group, and if the claim is approved, the registration covers each photograph and each photograph is registered as a separate work. Thus, if the photographs are subsequently infringed, the copyright owner should be entitled to seek a separate award of statutory damages for each individual photograph.

That is coming directly from the registrar, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Did you want to say anything about the case with Judge Batts, since I'm told you were furnished with a copy of it?

MR. FREEMAN: Yes, I was.

As soon as I saw it, I went right to the back and I saw that she was dealing with a compilation and a collective work. This case has nothing to do with the group registration, which is just really an administrative component or administrative benefit for the copyright hold that they don't

have to register each photograph separately. It would be way too expensive and way too burdensome. That method of registration does not in any way, shape, or form limit the amount of statutory damages.

I would also just like to add, your Honor, there is two other defenses that they've asserted to liability -- fair use and unclean hands -- both of which, again, seem to be throw-away defenses. We spent ten pages briefing the fair use defense, and their opposition was less than a page. And the substantive argumentation was in footnote on fair use.

The unclean hands defense, it is very rare, but it only applies if the alleged misconduct is somehow related to this litigation. In their brief, they are talking about e-mails that Steve Sands exchanged involving an entirely different production, Iron Fist. So, I mean, by their own admission, and they cited that rule that it has to be related to this litigation. The unclean hands defense should be dismissed as well as the fair use claim.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. LACKMAN: Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

MR. LACKMAN: I'm sorry, your Honor.

THE COURT: Again, go to the microphone.

MR. LACKMAN: Yes.

I'm not sure if your Honor wanted argument or to be

heard on the fair use or unclean hands defense. I am certainly prepared to argue that.

I just wanted to point out to the court that Mr. Freeman has misrepresented the cases that were cited in our reply brief. At page nine, there are cases involving group registration. And worse, I have — I have handed up the copyright registration issue in the case the decision issued yesterday posted this morning. It says application title group registration.

So this is exactly on point. We don't dispute that the party may be entitled to seek such award, but what we have here is that there is no evidence that would suggest that he would be entitled to an award. And in situations where that is a factor, where that can be decided by the court, the facts there are the same as the facts here. It is page two.

THE COURT: Hold on a minute. Just a minute.

MR. LACKMAN: Yes.

THE COURT: Thanks.

(Pause)

Well, just to say, I'm just seeing Judge Batts' opinion for the first time. But what she seems to be saying is is that, in fact, it was a compilation, however denominated. She talks about, at page 12 of her opinion, about situations where you can get separate awards. But then she goes on to say, The court finds that under these facts, where a copyright

holder chose to assemble into a collective hold, certain photographs during the registration of its copyright, i.e., registering them in sets rather than as individual photograph of works, the copyright holder has created a collective work in compilation as those terms are defined in Section 101. Therefore, the copyright holder is limited to recovery of one award, one award of statutory damages, per se."

That seems to be quite different from what the issue is here.

MR. LACKMAN: Well, if your Honor turns to the second page of the record, it does say group registration, but that is one of two arguments as well.

What I want to make sure is understood is that, in addition to that, even in the circumstances where they say you may be entitled to multiple awards, courts actually addressing the issue have time and again repeatedly said that when the works are presented under the same title, done at the same time, taken on the same day, then that entitlement goes away.

There are cases in our brief and in our reply brief as well that do talk about this specific point as well.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you very much.

MR. LACKMAN: Does your Honor want to hear on fair use or unclean hands?

THE COURT: No. I had not inquired previously about those because I felt I understood from the papers all I needed

on those points. If there is something you're dying to say on that...

MR. LACKMAN: Sure.

I just want to make it clear, we are not waiving, to your Honor's point of prematurity of fees, we are not waiving any arguments on fair use. Given where we are in the case, we wanted to get to the main merits. Certainly there is the way that they characterized the purpose of the photos and the way we characterize the purpose of the photos is different.

THE COURT: Well, if one party makes an argument in ten pages and the other argument responds in one page, I am also predisposed towards favoring the latter, but we'll see how it plays out in this case.

MR. LACKMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

We have page limits we try to prioritize. Certainly with respect to unclean hands, I mean, we have laid it out in our papers, and we just believe that this approach of a plaintiff who barges onto sets and sets up and settles cases for the purpose of trying to satisfy a willfulness presumption, that is not the way the court system is supposed to work, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. I thank both counsel for this helpful argument.

Because of the additional short telephonic deposition and the papers that follow from that, I won't be able to give

you an immediate ruling, but I will certainly get you a ruling, worst case, by the end of March. Since trial is not until April 22, that will be more than adequate time. Anything else we need to take up today? MR. FREEMAN: Not from the plaintiff, your Honor. Thank you. MR. LACKMAN: Not for defendant. Thank you. THE COURT: Very good. Thanks very much. (Adjourned)